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CORE PROCEEDINGS AND THE "NEW"
BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
Thomas S. Marrion*
INTRODUCTION

In 1978, bankruptcy jurisdiction underwent its most extensive revision in
eighty years. The product of nearly ten years of study, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 ("Reform Act")' was intended as a solution to problems
that could no longer be-adequately addressed by the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
("Act of 1898").2 Less than four years later, however, the Supreme Court
ruled that a central jurisdictional provision of the Reform Act violated article
III of the United States Constitution.' In response, Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 ("Act of
1984"), 4 which attempts to accommodate both the Constitution and the need
for efficient bankruptcy administration.
Although the terminology of the Act of 1984 is new, the structure of the
court system is markedly similar to that of the Act of 1898. Despite this
similarity, most courts and commentators have not given close attention to
case law developed under the Act of 1898 when discussing jurisdiction under
the new law. While there are differences between the systems, they are similar
enough that the case law developed under the Act of 1898 deserves a second
look. In fact, several of the "core proceedings" 5 that courts now find

* Thomas S. Marrion, A.B., College of the Holy Cross; J.D., University of Connecticut.
Mr. Marrion is Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert L. Krechevsky, Chief Judge, U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut. The author wishes to thank Professor Nathan
Levy, Jr. and Judge Krechevsky for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
1. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978). Title II of
the Reform Act contained the jurisdictional provisions.
2. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
3. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In
Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court struck down portions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 concerning the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts. The Act of 1984 was in part a response
to the Northern Pipeline decision.
Article III, § 1,of the U.S. Constitution provides that:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges .. .shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall,
at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office.
4. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, Title
I, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (1984). Core proceedings are matters in which bankruptcy judges
can enter orders and judgments, subject only to appeal to the district court. See infra notes
45-54 and accompanying text.

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:675

troublesome under the Act of 1984 have direct analogs in earlier case law.
Familiarity with prior law is necessary for full appreciation of the present
system. Accordingly, this Article outlines jurisdiction under the Act of 1898,
the Reform Act, and the Act of 1984. It then reviews several provisions of
the Act of 1984 included under the heading of "core proceedings" and
suggests interpretations of each of these provisions.
I.

1898
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 vested original jurisdiction over all bankruptcy
matters in the United States District Courts. 6 In turn, the district judges
referred certain matters to bankruptcy referees. 7 There were two main types
of bankruptcy matters under the Act of 1898: "proceedings" and "controversies." ' 8 "Proceedings" generally involved the administration of the bankrupt's estate and were solely within the province of the bankruptcy court.
"Controversies" were collateral disputes arising out of bankruptcy proceedings. These matters involved the trustee and third parties and could be heard
by either the bankruptcy court or by a non-bankruptcy court that had
jurisdiction. 9 While proceedings fell within the "summary jurisdiction" of
the bankruptcy court, controversies sometimes required district courts to
exercise "plenary jurisdiction." The two types of jurisdiction differed in the
following manner. Matters within the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court could be adjudicated through the use of more expeditious modes of
procedure, with the court sitting in equity. The district court qua bankruptcy
court could hear these matters; however, a bankruptcy referee usually rendered final judgment on such matters, subject only to "review" by the
district court." In contrast, plenary jurisdiction was exercised only by the
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF

6. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (repealed 1978). Section 1334 states, "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all matters and proceedings in
bankruptcy."
7. In 1973, the title of "bankruptcy referee" was changed to "bankruptcy judge" with
the enactment of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure. See Bankr. R. 901(7), 411 U.S.
995, 1092 (1973).
8. Under the law in effect since 1978, "proceedings" has a meaning quite different from
this one. See infra note 16.
9. Some controversies were, in fact, altogether outside the scope of federal jurisdiction,
because those not within summary jurisdiction required independent federal jurisdictional
grounds.
10. In fact, § 22a(l) of the Act of 1898 provided for automatic reference to the referee of
most bankruptcy matters. Section 22a and former Bankruptcy Rule 102(b), 411 U.S. 995, 1003
(1973), contained provisions allowing district judges to retain such matters, but in practice, this
was the exception rather than the rule. A district court sitting in "review" of a referee's decision
sat as an appellate court. Bankruptcy Rule 810, 411 U.S. 995, 1090 (1973), provided that the
district court sitting in review "shall accept the referee's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous," while reviewing de novo the referee's conclusions of law. Id. (In 1970, "review"
was changed to "appeal.") Rule 810 replaced General Order 47, 305 U.S. 679, 702 (1938),
which authorized the receipt of further evidence by a district judge in connection with review
of the referee's orders or findings. Id.
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district court or state courts, following their general rules of procedure.

According to some estimates, as much as fifty percent of all litigation under
the Act of 1898 concerned whether a matter was within the bankruptcy

court's summary jurisdiction."
Incident to this litigation, courts developed an elaborate system of rules
to determine whether a matter was within the summary jurisdiction of the

bankruptcy court. The Act of 1898 contained express grants of summary
jurisdiction, but most of these concerned proceedings in bankruptcy, over
which such jurisdiction already existed.' 2 Beyond this, the bankruptcy court
had summary jurisdiction over matters concerning property within the actual
or constructive possession of the bankruptcy court, 3 and over controversies
in which the parties had expressly or impliedly consented to summary

jurisdiction. 14 Cases decided under the Act of 1898 that developed theories

11. See Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction,22 HARV. J. LEoIS. 1,
6-7 (1985); Note, Scope of the Summary Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court, 40 COLUM. L.
REV. 489 (1940); S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5803. The reasons for this were several: (1) the prospect of appearing
in a court created for the purpose of administering the bankruptcy law may have been
intimidating to a lawyer not experienced in the field; (2) the right to trial by jury of most
matters within the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court did not exist, because the
bankruptcy court sat as a court of equity; (3) if a matter required a plenary suit, and no other
ground for federal jurisdiction existed, parties were required to litigate that matter in state
court; (4) matters within summary jurisdiction incorporated Bankruptcy Rule 704(c), which
provided for nationwide service of process, while district court service of process was (and is)
governed by Rule 4(c)(2)(C) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which incorporates state
law limits on service of process; and (5) in matters within summary jurisdiction, final judgment
could be rendered by a bankruptcy referee, a non-article III officer, subject only to appeal.
12. These grants included § 2a(21) (with Bankr. Rules 604 and 914), accounting by superseded
custodians; § 41b (with Rule 904), summary punishment for contempt before the referee; § 50n
(with Rule 925), breach of a condition of a bond under the Act; § 571 (with Rule 701), recovery
of an excessive dividend from a creditor; § 60d (with Rule 220), reexamination of attorney's
and professional fees; § 67a(4), determining rights under § 67a (dealing with liens and fraudulent
transfers); § 67f(4), determining rights under § 67f (dealing with investment companies); and
§ 70a(8), concernng property held by an assignee of the bankrupt when the assignment constituted
an act of bankruptcy. For acts of bankruptcy, see § 3 of the Act of 1898.
13. Note that the possession theory was created by the court rather than by statute. This
theory was an expression of the concept of in rem jurisdiction. The line of cases developing
this theory will be discussed below in the text accompanying notes 146-61.
14. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 2a (repealed 1978), states:
The . . . courts of bankruptcy . . . are hereby invested, within their respective
territorial limits . . . with such jurisdiction at law and in equity as will enable them
to exercise original jurisdiction in bankruptcy proceedings . . . [to]
(7) cause estates of bankrupts to be collected, reduced to money, and distributed,
and determine controversies in relation thereto, except as herein otherwise provided,
and determine and liquidate all inchoate or vested interests of the bankrupt's spouse
in property of any estate whenever, under applicable laws of a state, creditors are
empowered to compel such spouse to accept a money satisfaction for such interest;
and where in a controversy . . . an adverse party does not interpose an objection
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of implied consent and constructive possession are discussed below in connection with the Act of 1984.

II.

THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF

1978

Congress sought to centralize bankruptcy jurisdiction and expedite the
administration of bankruptcy cases through the Reform Act. The Reform

Act conferred on district courts original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
"cases" under title 11.11 It also gave district courts original and concurrent
jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising from or related to cases under
title 11.16 In turn, the Reform Act gave the bankruptcy courts "all of the
jurisdiction conferred by [the Reform Act] on the district courts.' ' 7 This
comprised jurisdiction over any action involving the debtor, including many
actions that would have required a plenary suit under the Act of 1898.18
Eighty years of litigation over the summary-plenary distinction were aban-

doned in favor of a simplified bankruptcy court system.
Cases that involve claimant creditors and counterclaiming bankruptcy
trustees illustrate this change. For example, under the Act of 1898, if a
creditor filed for allowance of a claim 9 in a bankruptcy case, and the trustee
counterclaimed on a completely unrelated set of facts, the counterclaim
would usually have required an action outside the bankruptcy court, 20 absent
consent of the parties. 2' Under the Reform Act, however, the bankruptcy
court could hear this counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive, 22 even

without implied consent and even if the property were not within the
possession of the bankruptcy court. Regardless of the nature of the coun-

to summary jurisdiction ... he shall be deemed to have consented to such jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added.) For an analog to § 2a(7) in current law, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1984).
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, § 23b (repealed 1978), stated, "Suits by the trustee shall only be
brought or prosecuted in the courts where the bankrupt ....
might have brought or prosecuted
them if proceedings in bankruptcy had not been instituted unless by consent of the proposed
defendant."
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (repealed 1984). "Case" is not defined in title 11 or title 28, but
it is the basic action by which an estate in bankruptcy is administered.
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (repealed 1984). The "civil proceeding" (or "proceeding") is an
action arising during and having some connection with a bankruptcy case.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (repealed 1984).
18. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
19. In the context of bankruptcy, a "claim" is a provable obligation. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(4) (1984).
20. The exceptions are certain counterclaims constituting objections under § 57g. See infra
notes 108-10 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
22. For the distinction between permissive and compulsory counterclaims, see infra notes
130-32.
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23
terclaim, the bankruptcy court could render final judgment on the issue.
The jurisdictional system established by the Reform Act was much more
efficient than that which existed under the Act of 1898.24 However, the
Supreme Court declared the system unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,25 holding the Reform Act to
be an excessive grant of jurisdiction to an article I court.
In January, 1980, Northern Pipeline Co. filed a reorganization petition in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota. 26 In March
of that year, Northern filed an action in the bankruptcy court against
Marathon Pipe Line Co. alleging, inter alia, breaches of contract and
warranty. Marathon filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the Reform Act
unconstitutionally conferred article III judicial power on non-article III
judges. The bankruptcy court denied the motion;27 the district court re-

versed. 2s On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court and

purported to invalidate the jurisdictional scheme of the Reform Act in its
entirety.
In discussing the requirements of article III, the plurality recognized only
three exceptions to the general rule that "the judicial power of the U.S.
must be vested in Article III courts" 2 9: territorial courts, courts martial, and
courts and agencies created to adjudicate "public rights." ' 30 The plurality
held that the judicial power conferred by the Reform Act fell under none
of these exceptions.
The Court next distinguished its earlier decisions in Crowell v. Benson3

23. This was subject only to appeal to the district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (repealed 1984).
Appeals were available, upon consent of the parties, to bankruptcy appellate panels in circuits
that had appointed such panels. As of this date, only the first and ninth circuits have appointed
appellate panels; their existence was not affected by the 1984 amendments. But see Commonwealth of Mass. v. Dartmouth House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984) (Northern
Pipeline raises serious questions regarding the constitutionality of bankruptcy appellate panels);
cf. Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1984) (reaching the opposite
conclusion). Under the Act of 1984, appeals are taken to bankruptcy appellate panels only
upon the consent of all the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1984).
24. But see 130 CoNG. REC. S8893, 92 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Sen. Orrin
Hatch to the effect that this would be less efficient).
25. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
26. Id. at 56 (plurality opinion).
27. 6 Bankr. 928 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980).
28. 12 Bankr. 946 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981).
29. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70-71 n.25 (plurality opinion).
30. Id.

31. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). In Crowell, the Court upheld a Congressional scheme empowering
the U.S. Employees' Compensation Commission to make initial factual determinations pursuant
to a federal statute requiring employers to compensate employees for work-related injuries on
the high seas. The injured employees were compensated irrespective of fault, according to a
fixed and mandatory schedule of compensation. The agency was thus left with the limited role
of determining questions of fact as to the circumstances and nature of the injury.
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and United States v. Raddatz,32 explaining that these cases did not support
the validity of the Reform Act's jurisdictional system. According to the
Court, Crowell and Raddatz supplied two principles: first, when Congress
creates a substantive federal right, it possesses substantial discretion to
prescribe the manner in which that right may be adjudicated; and second,
the functions of a tribunal set up in the exercise of that discretion must be
limited in such a way that the "essential attributes of judicial power are
retained in an Article III judge." 33 The jurisdictional scheme of the Reform
Act failed both parts of the Crowell-Raddatz test. The action involving
Northern and Marathon was concerned solely with a state-created cause of
action, not a federally-created right. Also, the Reform Act impermissibly
vested "most, if not all," of the essential attributes of the judicial power of
the United States in a non-article III court.34
Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the judgment, wrote separately that the
Court's holding should be limited to the issues presented by Northern and
Marathon: specifically, that the portion of section 1471 that allowed the
bankruptcy court to decide Northern's state law cause of action over Marathon's objection violated article III of the United States Constitution. 35
Rehnquist's opinion was cited in Chief Justice Burger's dissent as the true
holding of Northern Pipeline 6 and significantly influenced Congress in
amending the bankruptcy court system in 1984, more so than did the plurality
3
opinion. 1
III.

THE BANKRUPTCY AMENDMENTS AND

FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF

1984

Nearly two years after Northern Pipeline, Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984. Although the Act of 1984

32. 447 U.S. 667 (1980). Raddatz concerned the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(1979), which permits the district court to refer to a magistrate, without consent, a motion to
suppress evidence in a criminal case. Under that provision, the district court conducts a de
novo determination of the magistrate's findings of fact and conclusions of law, if timely
objection is made by a party.
33. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-81 (plurality opinion).
34. Id. at 84-85.
35. Id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). In fact, Chief Justice Burger had his own ideas
about what the concurrence actually said, injecting the concept of "peripherality," nowhere
mentioned in the concurrence. Several courts under the Act of 1984 have followed Chief Justice
Burger's example. See, e.g., Lesser v. A-Z Assoc. (In re Lion Capital Group), 46 Bankr. 850,
859 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
37. See infra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. See also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., U.S. -., 105 S. Ct. 3325, 3335 (1985), in which Justice O'Connor wrote for
the majority, "The court's holding in [Northern Pipeline] establishes only that Congress may
not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue
binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the
litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review."
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contains important substantive amendments to title 11,38 the most significant
changes concern the structure of the bankruptcy court system.3 9 As in the

Reform Act, the district courts are vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title 11, and original and concurrent jurisdiction
over all proceedings arising under or related to title 11.40 The critical difference between the Reform Act and the Act of 1984 is that under the latter,
bankruptcy courts do not exercise all jurisdiction vested in the district
courts.4 1 Instead, the bankruptcy court is established as a unit of the district
42
court to which the district court may refer any or all cases and proceedings.
The district court may revoke this reference on its own motion or on timely
motion of any party, for cause shown. 43 Thus, the district court, in form,
has complete control over what actions the bankruptcy court hears. Under
4
the Reform Act, the district court had no such power. 1
The Act of 1984 contains additional limitations on the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction. Proceedings 45 are divided into "core proceedings" and "proceedings that are not core proceedings" ("non-core proceedings"). Bankruptcy judges may hear and finally determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings, 46 subject to appeal to the district court. 47 The bankruptcy

judge may also hear non-core proceedings. However, if the parties do not
consent to final judgment in a non-core proceeding in the bankruptcy court,
the bankruptcy judge merely submits proposed findings of fact and conclu-

38. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365 (1984) (executory contracts) & § 1113 (1984) (rejection of
collective bargaining agreements).
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158 & 1334 (1984). See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)-(b) (1984). See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (repealed 1984); see supra note 21.
42. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1984). Section 151 provides that "the bankruptcy judges in regular
active service shall constitute a unit of the district court to be known as the bankruptcy court
for that district."
43. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1984).
44. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text. But see King, Jurisdictionand Procedure
under the Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 682 (1985) (.'[C]onsider'
and 'review' will disintegrate into rubber-stamped acceptances of the bankruptcy court's findings
and conclusions. The constitutional protection for Article III judges to adjudicate non-core
proceedings has been accomplished semantically and cosmetically. But actually little or no
change will occur.").
45. For the definition of proceeding, see supra note 16.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1984). For a non-exclusive list of core proceedings, see § 157(b)(2).
47. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1984) states:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to hear appeals from
final judgments, orders, and decrees, and, with leave of the court, from interlocutory
orders and decrees, of bankruptcy judges entered in cases aiid proceedings referred
to the bankruptcy judges under section 157 of this title. An appeal under this
subsection shall be taken only to the district court for the judicial district in which
the bankruptcy judge is serving.
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sions of law to the district judge." s If a party objects to a particular matter,
the district judge must conduct a de novo review of that matter. 9
The court structure established by the Act of 1984 bears a striking similarity

to the jurisdictional system developed under the Act of 1898.50 The identification of a proceeding as "core" under the present law is similar to a
determination under the Act of 1898 that the bankruptcy court had summary
jurisdiction over a particular matter. In each case, the bankruptcy judge
may enter final orders and judgments, subject only to appellate review. 5
While non-core proceedings under the Act of 1984 may be analogized to

plenary jurisdiction under the Act of 1898, this analogy is not perfect. Under
the Act of 1898, a bankruptcy court could not hear matters over which it
did not have summary jurisdiction without consent of the parties. 2 In
contrast, the Act of 1984 allows a bankruptcy court to hear non-core
proceedings. In non-core proceedings, however, a party who makes a timely
and specific objection to any issue will obtain de novo review by the district

court,53 despite the fact that the issue was originally tried before a bankruptcy

judge. Thus, notwithstanding this important difference, the analogy is worthwhile. In both core proceedings and summary matters, the bankruptcy judge
enters final judgments, subject only to appeal. In non-core proceedings and
plenary matters, parties have the right of ultimate access to an article III
court or a state court.14 The summary-plenary issue has been described as

48. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1984). See also § 157(c)(2) (parties may consent to final judgment
by bankruptcy judges in non-core proceedings).
49. Id. § 157(c)(1). Even if the parties do not object, the district judge must "consider"
the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings and conclusions. Id. Professor Walter Taggart suggests
that if no objection is made, the district judge need only satisfy himself that no clear error was
committed below. See Taggart, The New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 AM. BANKR. L.J. 231,
245 (1985). Professor Taggart makes the additional suggestion that although there is no specific
provision empowering the district judge to receive new evidence, the judge should be allowed
to do so. Id.; see infra note 64.
50. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1984) (Act of 1984); 11 U.S.C. §§ lla(7), 46b (repealed 1978)
(Act of 1898).
52. A possible exception is if the referee were sitting as a special master in a plenary suit.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1984). It is uncertain exactly what constitutes de novo review. In
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-76 (1980), the Supreme Court held that de novo
determination is not synonymous with a de novo hearing. "Review" does not imply a hearing
any more than "determination" does, especially if Congress had in mind the Raddatz decision
when using that language. Even if a de novo hearing were required, the practical significance
of this distinction could be great, since the district judge will always give some consideration
to the findings and conclusions that have been submitted by the bankruptcy judge. In any
event, the analogy stands up enough to make case law under the Act of 1898 meaningful to
this discussion.
54. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (matters outside the core
of bankruptcy administration "must, absent consent of the litigants, be heard by an 'Article
III court' if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United States" (emphasis added)).
As a practical matter, there are great differences between the summary-plenary distinction and
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one concerning modes of procedure, 5 but at its heart it concerned who
would render final judgment on an issue rather than how that issue would

be tried.16 The scope of summary jurisdiction under the Act of 1898 serves
as a helpful guideline to determine what matters can be considered at the
"core" of bankruptcy administration, making possible an exercise of full
judicial power by a non-article III officer.
To place the bankruptcy court's authority in core proceedings in context,
a discussion of non-core proceedings under thepresent law is necessary. This
requires a more thorough examination of the Supreme Court's decision in
57
United States v. Raddatz

Raddatz arose under the Federal Magistrates Act ("Magistrates Act"),58
which authorizes delegation of judicial duties to United States magistrates
in much the same way as non-core proceedings are now referred to bankruptcy judges. Under the Magistrates Act, a district judge can refer certain
matters to a magistrate without consent of the parties.5 9 The Magistrates
Act, with certain exceptions, permits the judge to refer any pending pretrial
matter to a magistrate for hearing and determination. 60 The judge may also
refer excepted matters, and certain other criminal matters, to the magistrate.

the core-noncore distinction. Under the Act of 1984, only rarely is there litigation over the
issue of who will hear a proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1984). Most disputes will concern
what power the bankruptcy judge can exercise with respect to a proceeding. Generally, since
there is no dispute over who will be the initial trier, parties may make the pragmatic choice to
consent to final judgment in the bankruptcy court, thereby avoiding the expense of a second
trial. This was not possible under the Act of 1898, because the dispute over summary or plenary
jurisdiction went to the issue of who heard the matter, not what power the initial trier could
exercise. While these are important differences, the analogy between the Acts of 1898 and 1984
remains useful. But see King, supra note 44, at 682.
Unlike the Act of 1898, bankruptcy jurisdiction under the Act of 1984 does not depend on
possession. However, that does not affect the relevance of prior law to a determination of the
scope of the bankruptcy judge's powers under present law. Cf. Ross v. General Plastic &
Chem. Corp. (In re Auto-Pak, Inc.), 52 Bankr. 3, 5 n.2 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985). Under the Act
of 1898, bankruptcy jurisdiction was co-extensive with the ability of a non-tenured judicial
officer to render final orders and judgments. Congress chose to let matters outside the core of
bankruptcy administration rest on independent jurisdictional grounds, with limited exceptions.
The fact that in 1984 Congress chose to vest jurisdiction over matters outside the core of
bankruptcy administration in the district courts does not affect the correspondence of the 1898
and 1984 Acts with regard to the ability of a non-article III officer to enter final orders and
judgments. In light of this correspondence, the scope of summary jurisdiction under the Act
of 1898 serves as a useful guideline in determining whether a matter is at the "core" of
bankruptcy administration and therefore within the scope of decision-making by a non-article
III bankruptcy judge.
55. See, e.g., D. CowANs, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 576 (2d ed. 1978).
56. This is so because matters within summary jurisdiction were rarely heard in the first
instance by anyone other than the referee. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
57. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
58. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1976).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 636(b)(1)(A).
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In such cases, however, the magistrate files proposed findings of fact and
recommendations with the district court. 6' The Magistrates Act further provides that, for matters referred under subsection (b)(1)(B), the district court
conducts a de novo determination of the portions of the magistrate's report
to which objection is made. The district court has the power to receive
further evidence, and to accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the
magistrate's findings and recommendations.62 Presumably, even if no objection is made, the district judge must still consider the magistrate's proposed6
findings and conclusions, rather than accepting them without consideration. 1
In Raddatz, a district court refused to rehear evidence on a suppression
motion in a criminal case. The court had referred the motion to the magistrate
under section 636(b)(1)(B). The magistrate found the defendant's testimony
less credible than the prosecution's evidence, and the district court accepted
those findings. The defendant claimed that the judge was required to rehear
the evidence on the suppression motion according to (1) the language of the
Federal Magistrates Act, (2) article III of the United States Constitution,
and (3) the due process clause of the United States Constitution. 64 In an
opinion joined at least in part by six justices, 65 the Court rejected all three
of the defendant's arguments. The majority held that a de novo determination
is not synonymous with a de novo hearing. While a rehearing by the district
judge is permissible, it is not required. Citing the legislative history of the
Magistrates Act, the Court concluded that Congress intended to permit
"whatever reliance a district judge, in . . . [his or her] discretion, chose to
66
place on [the magistrate's report]."9
The Court then held that the district court's refusal to rehear the evidence
did not violate article III, because the final determination on matters referred
under section 636(b)(1)(B) of the Magistrates Act was made by an article III
judge. 67 The Court emphasized the difference between findings of fact by
administrative agencies and by magistrates. Under the provisions in question,
the district court (1) appoints the magistrate,6" (2) has the power of reference
to the magistrate, 69 (3) can reject the magistrate's recommendations in whole
or in part,70 and (4) has an affirmative duty to review all determinations of
the magistrate. 7' The Court therefore concluded that magistrates are more

61. Id. § 636(b)(1).
62. Id.
63. See supra note 49.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
.65. Justices Blackmun and Powell wrote separate opinions, but both concurred in the
majority's statutory construction and article III determinations. This Article does not address
the due process issue, on which Blackmun concurred separately and Powell dissented.
66. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 676.
67. Id.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1976).
69. Id. § 636(b)(1).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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analogous to special masters than to an administrative agency under such a
scheme, because they are under the district court's "total control and juris-

diction. "72
According to the Northern Pipeline plurality, Raddatz and Crowell v.
Benson73 contain two principles. First, Congress possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which a right may be adjudicated when
Congress itself has created that right. Second, the functions of an adjunct
set up in the exercise of that discretion must be limited in such a way that
the "essential attributes of judicial power are retained in an Article III
judge." 4 Northern Pipeline literally suggests that these two principles are
conjunctive: Congress can set up an adjunct to perform article III duties
only for adjudication of congressionally-created substantive rights, and the
adjunct's functions must be properly limited. If these requirements are
conjunctive, then non-core proceedings could be safely referred to a bankruptcy judge only when congressionally-created substantive rights are involved. As the Northern Pipeline plurality noted, however, the magistrate
in Raddatz determined constitutional rights, not congressionally-created rights.
It follows that whatever principles Crowell and Raddatz provide, they must
embrace reference to an adjunct of more than just congressionally-created
substantive rights.
The scheme upheld in Raddatz is virtually indistinguishable from the
treatment of non-core proceedings under the Act of 1984. 71 For article III
purposes, there are only three differences. First, while magistrates are appointed by district courts, bankruptcy judges are appointed by courts of
appeals. 76 Second, under the Act of 1984, district courts have the power to
withdraw any reference to bankruptcy judges, while there was no such
provision in Raddat. 77 Third, the magistrate in Raddatz determined a federal
constitutional claim, while non-core proceedings will in most instances consist
of questions of state law.
It is not constitutionally significant that bankruptcy judges are appointed
by courts of appeals rather than district courts. Appointment by the district
court was not central to Raddatz's conclusion that magistrates are "constantly subject to the court's control." The immediate relation of the district
judge to the magistrate in each case was more significant. The Act of 1984

72. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 681.

73. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
74. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80-81 (plurality opinion). See supra notes 31-34 and
accompanying text.
75. Both permit reference to an adjunct without consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a)
& 636(b)(1) (1984). Both place the power of reference in the district court. Id. In addition,
both require de novo consideration of the adjunct's report and allow the district court to accept,
reject, or modify any part of the report. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 157(c)(1) & 636(b)(1) (1984). As
a result, final determination of all matters heard by the adjunct is made by the district court.
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152(a)(1), 631 (1984).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (1984). See infra note 79.
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gives district courts the same power as the Magistrates Act-to exercise control
over bankruptcy judges in individual cases.78 In fact, the new law places
bankruptcy judges under stricter district court control by giving district judges
the power to withdraw reference at any time. 79 Accordingly, appointment of
bankruptcy judges by courts of appeals should not be a problem.
The nature of the issues decided by the adjunct is more significant. The
underlying issue in Raddatz was constitutional-whether the defendant's
confession was freely and voluntarily given.80 The Raddatz Court appeared
unconcerned with this fact. 1A fact, the Court made no attempt to exclude
other matters referrable to magistrates under section 636(b)(1)(B) from its
decision, many of which could involve questions of state law.8, The Court
made no mention of the nature of the legal issue considered by the magistrate:
Thus, although the statute permits the district court to give to the magistrate's proposed findings of fact and recommendations "such weight as
[their] merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants,"
... that delegation does not violate Article III so long as the ultimate
decision is made by the district court.2
It would be easy to limit Raddatz to its facts, and thereby distinguish
reference of a non-core proceeding involving a question of state law. However, the tone of the majority opinion in Raddatz, joined by six of the
Justices, suggests that the structure of the adjunct system was the paramount
consideration. Thus, as long as the "ultimate decision" is made by an article
III tribunal, Congress can delegate federal judicial power to non-article III
officers. 3 The treatment of non-core proceedings under the new law satisfies
the requirements of article III as set forth in Raddatz.
IV.

CORE PROCEEDINGS

As noted above, bankruptcy judges can enter orders and judgments in
core proceedings, subject only to appellate review. 84 Section 157 of the Act
contains a non-exclusive list of matters that constitute core proceedings.
Most of these matters directly concern the administration of the debtor's

78. See supra notes 41-49.
79. Section 636(c) deals with consensual reference to magistrates; § 636(b) governs nonconsensual reference. While § 636(c) has a similar provision for withdrawal of reference,
§ 636(b) has no such provision.
80. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 671.
81. Among those matters are motions for injunctive relief, judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
and involuntary dismissal. In a diversity case, any of these could raise issues of state law.
82. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 683.

83. Id.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1984).
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estate" and, as a result, raise few questions of constitutionality or statutory
construction. 86 These matters are similar to "proceedings in bankruptcy"
under the Act of 1898, summary jurisdiction over which was never seriously

questioned. While that does not of itself validate the designation of such
matters as core proceedings, they all concern congressionally-created substantive rights. The Northern Pipeline plurality noted that "[Congress] pos-

sesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which [such rights]
may be adjudicated. 8' 7 The plurality strongly suggested that a non-article
III federal officer can exercise full judicial power over matters at the heart
of bankruptcy administration. However, some other matters listed as core
proceedings raise interesting questions.

A.

Counterclaims by the Estate

The Act of 1984, in section 157(b)(2)(C) of title 28, provides that "counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the estate" are
core proceedings. 8 However, the treatment of all counterclaims by the estate
as core proceedings could give rise to constitutional problems. A counterclaim
by the estate creates a scenario distinguishable from that of Northern Pipeline, in which Marathon had not filed a claim in Northern's reorganization.

However, a creditor's filing of a claim in a bankruptcy case does not suffice
to allow issuance of final judgments by a bankruptcy judge over all counterclaims against that creditor. Northern Pipeline emphasized the fact that
Northern's claim involved a "right created by state law, a right independent

85. Core proceedings are enumerated at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O) (1984). They include
matters concerning the administration of the estate (subsection (A)); allowance or disallowance
of claims against the estate or exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims
or interests for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11 or 13 of title 11, but not
the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful
death claims against the estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11 (subsection
(B)); orders in respect to obtaining credit (subsection (D)); motions to terminate, annul or
modify the automatic stay (subsection (G)); determinations as to the dischargeability of particular
debts (subsection (I)); objections to discharges (subsection (J)); determinations of the validity,
extent, or priority of liens (subsection (K)); confirmations of plans (subsection (L)); orders
approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral (subsection (M));
orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from claims brought by the
estate against persons who have not filed claims against the estate (subsection (N)); and other
proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtorcreditor or the equity security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims (subsection (0)).
86. Some have argued that all state law-based claims, even by creditors against bankruptcy
debtors, should be adjudicated in state courts, not by the bankruptcy system. See, e.g., 130
CoNc. REc. S8891, 92 (daily ed. June 29, 1984) (remarks of Senator Hatch). No federal court
has yet endorsed this view, which is inconsistent with the very concept of a federal bankruptcy
system.
87. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 (plurality opinion).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (1984).
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of and antecedent to the reorganization petition that conferred jurisdiction
on the bankruptcy court." 8 9 This was at least as important as the fact that
Marathon had not filed a claim against Northern.
Of course, core treatment of counterclaims by the estate would not be

constitutionally deficient in every case. Section 157(c)(2) provides that "the
district court, with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding, may
refer a proceeding related to a case under title 11 to a bankruptcy judge to
hear and determine and to enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject
to review under section 158 of this title." 9 In other words, parties can
consent to entry of final orders and judgments by the bankruptcy judge in
non-core proceedings. This corresponds to provisions under the Act of 1898
whereby parties could consent to the summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy

court. 9' Litigation under the Act of 1898 on the issue of implied consent is
particularly helpful to an understanding of when a creditor filing a claim
under the Act of 1984 may be deemed to have consented to "core treatment"
over a counterclaim against him by the estate. 92
Early case law reflected the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend summary
jurisdiction by implied consent. In Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor,93 the

adverse claimant came into bankruptcy court in obedience to a pre-emptory
order. 94 The claimant in Comingor made formal protest to the exercise of
summary jurisdiction, even though he participated in proceedings before the
referee. Summary jurisdiction was denied on the ground that the claimant
did not come voluntarily into court and did not consent to jurisdiction

89. 458 U.S. at 84 (plurality opinion). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3259 (1986) ("Of course, the nature of the claim has significance in
our Article III analysis quite apart from the method prescribed for its adjudication").
90. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(2) (1984).
91. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2a(7), 23b (repealed 1978); see supra notes 6-14 and accompanying text.
As noted, this correspondence is not perfect. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
92. Professor Walter Taggart has noted that in a proceeding in which a party has failed to
object to core treatment, it is unnecessary to consider the question of implied consent; instead,
the court can treat this as a waiver of the party's right to non-core treatment. See Taggart,
supra note 49, at 243. In some cases, however, parties will file timely objections. In those
situations, a finding of implied consent may nonetheless be warranted. Both Katchen v. Landy,
382 U.S. 323 (1966), and Inter-State Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th
Cir. 1955), illustrate this point. In the discussion of implied consent that follows, this Article
assumes that all parties have filed all possible timely objections to core treatment of their
claims.
Proposed Bankruptcy Rules 7008 and 7012 apparently require express consent of the parties
in non-core matters. Even if that rule is enacted, however, the following discussion is relevant to
whether counterclaims can be considered within the "core" of bankruptcy jurisdiction. See
infra note 145. Consent was not the only basis for summary jurisdiction. For a discussion of
actual or constructive possession as a basis for jurisdiction, see infra text accompanying notes
150-57.
93. 184 U.S. 18 (1902).
94. A pre-emptory order is a demand to a party to appear in court. In contrast, a party.
filing a proof of claim appears voluntarily.
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merely by participating in proceedings before the referee. 95 In Daniel v.
Guaranty Trust,9 6 the claimant appeared in court voluntarily, by filing a

petition for reclamation of specific property held by the trustee in bankruptcy. The Supreme Court held, however, that the bankruptcy court did

not acquire summary jurisdiction to enter a turnover order concerning
97

matters having no immediate relation to the claim it had presented.
Alexander v. Hillman" helped set the stage for granting summary jurisdiction to afford affirmative relief on a trustee's counterclaim, though it
was a receivership case, not a bankruptcy case. In Hillman, the adverse
claimants filed claims against a part of the receivership estate. The Supreme

Court sustained the equity jurisdiction of the receivership court over the
receiver's counterclaims against the claimants. The Supreme Court deter-

mined that the receivership court was empowered to decide all matters in
dispute and decree complete relief between the parties, because the claimants
had voluntarily invoked the court's equity jurisdiction. 99
Federal courts soon began applying the Hillman rationale to bankruptcy
cases. °° A claimant creditor now risked "all of the disadvantages which may
flow to him as a consequence, as well as gaining all the benefits"'' 1 by
invoking the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. Inter-State National Bank

of Kansas City v. Luther'0 2 is the most significant decision of the lower
federal courts in this area. Before Luther, the bankruptcy court's summary
jurisdiction was limited to certain compulsory counterclaims by the bank-

ruptcy trustee' 03 and counterclaims in the nature of recoupment.

04

Luther

95. Comingor, 184 U.S. at 26. In Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97 (1944), the Supreme Court
elaborated on the Comingor rule, stating that the requisite consent to summary jurisdiction
depended on the facts of each case, and that participation in the summary proceedings in
obedience to a pre-emptory order (in Cline, an order to show cause) did not amount to consent
if formal objection was made before the final order. Id. at 99. An amendment of Bankruptcy
Act § 2a(7) was interpreted as a codification of this rule by negative inference, see Inter-State
Nat'l Bank of Kansas City v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 387-88 (10th Cir. 1955), though the language
of the statute itself apparently is not limited to situations involving pre-emptory orders. For
the amended § 2a(7), see supra note 14.
96. 285 U.S. 154 (1932).
97. Id. at 162-64.
98. 296 U.S. 222 (1935).
99. Id. at 241 ("[b]y presenting their claims respondents subjected themselves to all the
consequences that attach to an appearance"). Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3257 (1986) (by availing himself of the quicker and less expensive
procedure, "Schor effectively agreed to an adjudication by the CFTC of the entire controversy").
100. Chase Nat'l Bank of City of New York v. Lyford, 147 F.2d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 1945);
Florance v. Kresge, 93 F.2d 784, 786 (4th Cir. 1938); In re Nathan, 98 F. Supp. 686, 691 (S.D.
Cal. 1951).
101. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106, 127 (1939).
102. 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955).
103. A compulsory counterclaim arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter of the opposing party's claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
104. See 4 J. MOORE, R. OGLEBAY & L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 68.20 (14th ed.
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used the Hillman rationale to extend summary jurisdiction to afford affirmative relief on a permissive counterclaim by the trustee. 05
In Luther, Inter-State National Bank filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceedings based on a $50,000 secured promissory note of the
bankrupt. The trustee filed a permissive counterclaim, alleging that the bank
had obtained a $150,000 voidable preference from the bankrupt, and that
the bank should be required to disgorge the entire preference before its
initial claim would be allowed. In response, the bank objected to the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction over the counterclaim, claiming the right
to a plenary suit on the issues raised in the counterclaim. The bankruptcy
referee chose an intermediate position, offsetting the bank's claim against
the alleged preference and directing that the trustee recover the difference
from the bank." The district court and court of appeals adopted the trustee's
argument, however, granting summary jurisdiction over the bank's claim
07
and disallowing the claim until it surrendered the entire preference.
Two ideas are essential to an understanding of the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Luther. First, the trustee's counterclaim alleged a voidable preference and
thus came within the scope of section 57g of the Act of 1898.108 Both Luther
and the later Supreme Court case of Katchen v. Landy'09 considered section
57g to be an integral part of the process of allowance and disallowance of
claims in bankruptcy. As a result, objections under section 57g, whether in
the form of permissive or compulsory counterclaims, were subject to the
summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." 0 Second, the Luther court
not only allowed the exercise of summary jurisdiction over the trustee's
counterclaims, it also required surrender of the bank's preference in full
before allowing its claim in the bankruptcy proceedings. Some courts had
set off claims and counterclaims against each other,"' as did the referee in
Luther. Other courts allowed the referee to hear a counterclaim, enter an

1976), which states:
Frequently, a claimant may institute some sort of proceeding in the bankruptcy
court, whereupon the trustee may seek to assert a set-off, counterclaim or recoupment in that proceeding. So long as such claim is asserted only to reduce or
extinguish the plaintiff's claim, there is no question that the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction to entertain it,
105. A permissive counterclaim is any claim against an opposing party not arising out of the
transaction that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
106. Luther, 221 F.2d at 386.
107. Id. at 389-90.
108. "The claims of creditors who have received or acquired preferences, liens, conveyances,
transfers, assignments or encumbrances, void or voidable under this Act, shall not be allowed
unless such creditors shall surrender such preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments,
or encumbrances." 11 U.S.C. § 93g (repealed 1978).
109. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
110. Id. at 330-31; Luther, 221 F.2d at 389.
111. Metz v. Knobel, 21 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1927); Fitch v. Richardson, 147 F. 197 (lst Cir.
1906).
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order on the merits, and then require the trustee to institute a plenary suit
to obtain affirmative relief on the counterclaim. The referee's order then
constituted res judicata on the merits. I2 The Luther court adopted the logical
position that the bankruptcy court should be allowed to grant affirmative
relief on counterclaims if it had summary jurisdiction to adjudicate them) 13
The Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of summary jurisdiction to
4
grant affirmative relief on trustee's counterclaims in Katchen v. Landy."
Katchen, an officer of the bankrupt corporation, was an accommodation
maker on two notes for the bankrupt's indebtedness. The bankrupt suffered
a fire, and its funds and collections were placed in a trust account under
Katchen's sole control. Katchen made payments from the account on each
of the two notes, and bankruptcy ensued within four months." 5 Katchen
filed two claims in the bankruptcy proceedings, one for rent due to him
from the bankrupt, the other for payment he made on one of the notes
from his own funds. By way of counterclaim, the trustee asserted that the
payments from the trust account were voidable preferences, because they
reduced Katchen's indebtedness as an accommodation maker on the notes.116
Katchen claimed that he was guaranteed a jury trial on the issues raised in
the trustee's counterclaim by the seventh amendment"1 7 and the rule of Beacon
Theatres v. Westover"8 and Dairy Queen v. Wood. 119 He argued that those

issues required adjudication in a plenary suit, because matters over which

112. Giffin v. Vought, 175 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1949).
113. Luther, 221 F.2d at 389. The claiming creditor gained nothing by requiring the trustee
to institute a plenary suit, since all important issues would be res judicata. On the other hand,
by allowing the bankruptcy court to grant affirmative relief on issues over which it had summary
jurisdiction, both parties would be saved the time-consuming task of instituting another lawsuit
that was in essence a formality.
114. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
115. Id. at 325.
116. Act of 1898, § 60a(l), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1) (repealed 1978), states:
A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of a debtor
to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made
or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing
by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect
of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
For treatment of preferences under current law, see 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1984).
117. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII, states, "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a
jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law."
118. 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
119. 369 U.S. 469 (1962). The rule of the two cases is essentially that "only under the most
imperative circumstances, circumstances which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal
Rules [of Civil Procedure] we cannot now anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues
be lost through prior determination of equitable claims." Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 51011.

DEPA UL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:675

the bankruptcy court had summary jurisdiction were not heard by juries.
The bankruptcy court overruled Katchen's objections to summary jurisdiction over the counterclaims and held that Katchen's claims would be
20
allowed only when and if the judgment on the preference was satisfied.'
2
The district court and court of appeals affirmed.1 ' The Supreme Court also
affirmed, basing its decision on the "important Congressional directive" of
section 57g. The Court observed that the language of section 57g "is concerned with creditors rather than claims and thus contemplates that allowance
of a claim may be conditioned on surrender of preferences received with
respect to transactions unrelated to the claims.' 22
The Court then addressed the trial by jury issue. The Court pointed out
that "when [an] issue arises as part of the process of allowance and disallowance of claims [in bankruptcy], it is triable in equity,"'2 and "the right
of trial by jury . . . does not extend to cases of equity jurisdiction."', 24 The
Court noted that the Beacon Theatres-DairyQueen rule did not apply because
"in neither [of those two cases] was there involved a specific statutory
scheme contemplating the prompt trial of a disputed claim without the
intervention of a jury.' ' 2 5 Apparently, the statutory scheme prescribed by
Congress constituted a circumstance "imperative" enough to warrant an
exception to the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen rule.
Katchen v. Landy and Inter-State National Bank of Kansas City v. Luther
both placed emphasis on the congressional directive for expedient bankruptcy
administration expressed in section 57g. 26 The drafters of the Reform Act
derived section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code 27 from section 57g of the
Act of 1898. In fact, the scope of section 502(d) is somewhat broader than
that of its predecessor. 2 ' As a result, section 502(d) should at least inherit

120. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 325.
121. Alhough the Tenth Circuit reversed a judgment for the trustee on a stock subscription,
it affirmed the judgment for the amount of the voidable preferences. The stock subscription
issue was not appealed to the Supreme Court. Katchen v. Landy, 336 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1964).
122. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 330 n.5. But see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor,
106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986) (considering Katchen to have concerned only compulsory counterclaims).
123. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336.
124. Id. at 337 (quoting Barton v. Barbour, 104 U.S. 126, 133-34 (1881)). This, of course,
ignores the rule of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, which the Court distinguished on a
different basis.
125. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339.
126. Id. at 330-31; Luther, 221 F.2d at 389-90.
127. This non-jurisdictional provision of the Reform Act of 1978 figures prominently in
making use of the implied consent cases discussed above.
128. II U.S.C. § 93g (repealed 1978) states, "The claims of creditors who have received or
acquired preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments or encumbrances, void or
voidable under this Act shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender such preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or encumbrances."
11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1984) states:
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, the court shall disallow any
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Katchen's interpretation of section 57g and thereby provide core treatment
to all counterclaims characterized as section 502(d) objections, regardless of
whether such objection constitutes a compulsory or permissive counterclaim. 129
Katchen, however, leaves open the question of how compulsory or per-

missive counterclaims outside the scope of section 502(d) should be treated.
Nevertheless, additional sources are helpful. Bankruptcy Rule 7013, with
exceptions not relevant here, provides that Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure applies in adversary proceedings. 30 Rule 13 provides for

compulsory and permissive counterclaims. 3' While counterclaims arising out

claim of any entity from which property is recoverable under section 542, 543, 550,
or 553 of this title or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under section
522(0, 522(h), 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, or 724(a) of this title, unless such entity or
transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for which such
entity or transferee is liable under section 522(i), 542, 543, 550, or 553 of this title.
129. As one court has noted, Katchen was decided before Bankruptcy Rule 810 replaced
General Order 47, 305 U.S. 679 (1935). General Order 47 authorized receipt of further evidence
by the district judge in connection with review of a referee's orders or findings. 1616 Reminc
Ltd. Pshp. v. Atchison & Keller, 704 F.2d 1313, 1316 (4th Cir. 1983). Rule 810 provided, as
does current Bankruptcy Rule 8013, that on appeal to the district court, findings of fact by
the bankruptcy judge shall not be set aside unless "clearly erroneous." However, Katchen made
no mention whatsoever of General Order 47, and the denial of a trial by jury is premised on
the very assumption that a district judge's jurisdiction in matters within summary jurisdiction,
heard by the referee, is that of an ordinary appellate court. But see infra note 167.
The plurality opinion in Northern Pipeline pointed out that Katchen did not discuss
article III. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 79 n.31 (plurality opinion). However, the principles endorsed in that case by the concurring justices show no indication that the scheme
approved on seventh amendment grounds in Katchen would run afoul of article III requirements.
See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. In addition, the seven-justice majority in
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3258 (1986), cited Katchen as
precedent for upholding the CFTC's jurisdiction over common-law counterclaims on article III
grounds, certainly a stronger indication of Katchen's precedential value than a footnote contained in a four-member plurality opinion.
130. Bankruptcy Rule 7013, 11 U.S.C., states:
Rule 13 F.R.Civ.P. applies in adversary proceedings, except that a party sued by
a trustee or debtor-in-possession need not state as a counterclaim any claim which
he has against the debtor, his property, or the estate, unless the claim arose after
the entry of an order for relief. A trustee or debtor-in-possession who fails to plead
a counterclaim through oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect, or when justice
so requires, may by leave of court amend the pleading, or commence a new adversary
proceeding or separate action.
For what constitutes an "adversary proceeding," see Bankr. R. 7001, 11 U.S.C. Adversary
proceedings are governed by Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules, which incorporate certain of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
131. FED. R. Crv. P. 13 states:
(a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim
which at the time of serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing
party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
the opposing party's claim . . ..
(b) Permissive Counterclaims. A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim
against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is
the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.
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of the same transaction as an opposing party's claim must be raised in a
federal lawsuit, a counterclaim that does not arise out of the same transaction
3 2
must rest upon independent grounds of jurisdiction.
The argument for core treatment of all compulsory counterclaims requires
only a straightforward reading of Rule 7013. However, reading Rule 7013
in this way can deprive a claiming creditor of a jury trial for a legal issue.
It also overlooks the possibility that an issue raised in a counterclaim "must
be heard by an 'Article III court' if it is to be heard by any court or agency
of the United States.'1

33

Bankruptcy judges preside in courts of equity, where parties may not have
the right to trial by jury.' 34 To go no further than this, however, begs the
question of whether claiming creditors should be forced to defend a compulsory counterclaim as a core proceeding, thus depriving them of an otherwise constitutionally-guaranteed trial by jury. 35 Although Katchen noted
the significance of section 57g, it also stressed the equitable purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act and the specific statutory scheme enacted by Congress. The

132. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 79 (4th ed. 1983). See also Federman v. Empire
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1979). The one exception to this rule is
that no independent jurisdictional basis is required for a permissive counterclaim if it is in the
nature of a set-off and is used only to reduce the plaintiff's judgment, not as a basis for
affirmative relief. See Curtis v. J.E. Caldwell & Co., 86 F.R.D. 454 (E.D. Pa. 1980); 4 J.
MOORE, R. OGLEBAY & L. KING, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 68.20 (14th ed. 1976). Permissive
counterclaims should not be considered within the scope of § 157(b)(2)(C). In addition to the
fact that they require an independent jurisdictional basis, their resolution is not at the core of
bankruptcy administration. The justifications given below for core treatment of compulsory
counterclaims do not support such treatment of permissive counterclaims. To treat permissive
counterclaims as core proceedings would vest bankruptcy judges with too broad a range of
powers to satisfy the holding of Northern Pipeline.
133. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Courts and commentators are divided on the issue of whether
bankruptcy courts can conduct jury trials. See, e.g., In re Morse Elec. Co., 12 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
957 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1985); Bokum Resources Corp. v. LILCO (In re Bokum Resources
Corp.), 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. II (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1411 (1984)
(guarantees jury trial in connection with bankruptcy case only for individuals with personal
injury or wrongful death claims). Section 1411 is a limitation of the former 28 U.S.C. § 1480
(repealed 1978). Cf. King, supra note 44, at 703-04. If bankruptcy courts were allowed to
conduct jury trials, the jury trial objection would be moot in many cases. See generally Levy,
Trial by Jury Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 12 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1979).
135. In its treatment of Beacon Theatres and Dairy Queen, Katchen observed:
Thus petitioner's argument would require that in every case where a section 57g
objection is interposed and a jury trial is demanded the proceedings on allowance
of claims must be suspended and a plenary suit initiated, with all the delay and
expense that course would entail. Such a result is not consistent with the equitable
purposes of the Bankruptcy Act nor with the rule of Beacon Theatres and Dairy
Queen, which is itself an equitable doctrine .... In neither Beacon Theatres nor
Dairy Queen was there a specific statutory scheme contemplating the prompt trial
of a disputed claim without the intervention of a jury.
Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339.
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Act of 1984 contains both of these: the equitable purposes, described elsewhere in the Katchen opinion as "prompt and effectual administration" of
bankrupt estates, 13 6 and a statutory scheme providing for entry of orders
and judgments by bankruptcy judges in "core proceedings." The language
of Katchen suggests that the congressionally-expressed 3 7 need for prompt
and effectual bankruptcy administration is a circumstance imperative enough
to justify an exception to the Beacon Theatres-Dairy Queen rule for all
compulsory counterclaims.
The article III question is more difficult. In view of Katchen's emphasis
on expediency and efficiency in bankruptcy administration, one approach
would be to extend the consent theory of Katchen to all compulsory counterclaims. 3 ' Section 57g's "Congressional directive" can also be inferred
from the jurisdictional provisions of the Act of 1984. Expeditious bankruptcy
administration is as desirable now as it was at the time of Katchen. In
addition, treating all compulsory counterclaims as core proceedings could
help avoid time-consuming litigation over the nature of the compulsory
counterclaim without overstepping constitutional limits.
Under the Act of 1898, the bounds of implied consent were determined
independently of actual acquiescence by claimants. A finding of implied
consent represented an expression of perceived congressional policy, provided
that policy was consistent with the Constitution. Thus, if Congress intended
core proceedings under the Act of 1984 to include all compulsory counterclaims by the estate, a creditor filing a claim in bankruptcy should be deemed
to have consented to core treatment of all such counterclaims. It would do
violence neither to the spirit of Katchen nor to congressional intent 3 9 to
apply the consent theory under the Act of 1984 and to extend it to all
40
compulsory counterclaims by the estate. 1
Although extension of the consent theory may provide a solution to the
article III problem, the sounder approach is to determine whether the Act
of 1984 has retained "the essential attributes" of judicial power in an article
III court, notwithstanding core treatment for all compulsory counterclaims.' 4'
It is generally accepted that bankruptcy courts may hear and determine

136. Id. at 328.
137. This need is expressed by the enactment of federal bankruptcy laws, not by any legislative
history. See infra notes 195-96.
138. Parties do not "waive" article III jurisdictional requirements. It is important to note
that jurisdiction in bankruptcy is given to the district court, independent of consent of the
parties. The parties merely "consent" to the particular mode of trial-something that can be
waived by consent. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 38 (waiver of right to trial by jury if no timely
request made). See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256
(1986) ("Article III's guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject
to waiver").
139. See supra note 137.
140. But see supra note 92 (discussion of proposed Bankr. R. 7008 & 7012).
141. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81 (plurality opinion).
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claims against the estate, whether the claim is based upon state or federal

law. If a creditor files a proof of claim that is based on a state law-based
cause of action, the bankruptcy court can hear and determine that claim.
This is the type of determination that lies at the heart of the federal
bankruptcy power: the gathering into one forum of all claims against the
debtor's estate and the "prompt and effectual administration and settlement
of [that] estate. 1' 42 Nothing in Northern Pipeline calls into question the
constitutionality of non-article III bankruptcy judges hearing and determining
state law-based proofs of claim. Northern Pipeline concerned a breach of

contract claim brought by the debtor against a third party. Because bankruptcy judges can hear and determine claims against the estate, they should
be able to do the same with respect to compulsory counterclaims by the
estate against a creditor filing a claim. For example, the ability to hear and
determine a claim against the estate based upon a contract would be nugatory
if it did not entail the ability to hear and determine the estate's counterclaims
based upon the same contract. 43 By allowing bankruptcy judges to hear and
determine compulsory counterclaims against creditors, section 157(b)(2)(C)'4
merely gives bankruptcy judges the power to grant complete relief between
parties on matters that are at the heart of bankruptcy administration. 45
B.

Orders to Turn Over Property of the Estate

Core proceedings also include "orders to turn over property of the es-

tate.'

' 46

Again, a broad interpretation of this section could raise constitu-

142. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 328.
143. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3260 (1986) ("absent
the CFTC's [jurisdiction over counterclaims], the purposes of the reparations procedure would
have been confounded").
144. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (1984).
145. Therefore, such counterclaims could be treated as core proceedings without reference
to the consent issue. See also Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245
(1986) (upholding the CFTC's jurisdiction over counterclaims arising out of the same transaction
or occurrence as the complaint's allegations of Commodities Exchange Act violations).
One more problem remains under the heading of counterclaims. Under I I U.S.C. § I 1I I(a),
a claim of a creditor listed by a chapter II debtor on its schedule of debts is deemed to have
been filed by that creditor, unless the claim is scheduled as disputed, contingent or unliquidated.
I U.S.C. § III 1(a) provides, "A proof of claim or interest is deemed filed under section 501
of this title for any claim or interest that appears in the schedules filed under section 521(1) or
I106(a)(2) of this title, except a claim or interest that is scheduled as disputed, contingent, or
unliquidated."
.If a chapter II debtor lists a creditor's claim on its schedule of debts, can it then file a
counterclaim against that creditor and have the counterclaims adjudicated as core proceedings?
A reasonable solution is to give the creditor in such circumstances a choice of whether to make
an affirmative filing in the chapter 11 case, thereby giving the chapter 11 creditor the same
choice as a creditor in chapters 7, 9 and 13. If the creditor chooses to file a claim, he or she
will be subject to the same rules as any other claiming creditor; if the creditor chooses not to
file a claim, he or she will not be subject to counterclaims by the estate, but will have the same
problems as any creditor wondering whether to file the claim in a bankruptcy case.
146. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(E) (1984).
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tional problems. Creditors who have not filed claims and who choose not
47
may, under
to consent to the jurisdiction of the "bankruptcy court"'
certain circumstances, demand a determination of the turnover issue in an
article III court. 4s An enormous variety of issues can arise in turnover
actions. Many will have no connection with bankruptcy except that a bankruptcy trustee is raising them. 149 This raises constitutional issues because
bankruptcy judges can exercise full judicial power only within the limited
jurisdiction granted by article I. In Northern Pipeline, the Supreme Court
struck down a system in which it perceived that bankruptcy judges exercised
full judicial power outside the limits of article I jurisdiction. Treating all
turnover actions as core proceedings would create the same problem. Accordingly, the ability of bankruptcy judges to treat turnover actions as core

147. This term is in quotation marks because under the Act of 1984, there are no independent
bankruptcy courts per se; rather, the bankruptcy judges constitute a unit of the district court
known as the bankruptcy court. 28 U.S.C. § 151 (1984). The use of the term "jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court" is a convenient and accurate way of expressing the idea of jurisdiction
sufficient for a bankruptcy judge to enter orders and judgments in a proceeding, subject only
to appellate review.
148. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (1984) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity, other than
a custodian, in possession, custody, or control, during the case, of property that
the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this title, or that the debtor
may exempt under section 522 of this title, shall deliver to the trustee, and account
for, such property or the value of such property, unless such property is of
inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) or (d) of this section, an entity that owes
a debt that is property of the estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or
payable on order, shall pay such debt to, or on the order of, the trustee, except to
the extent that such debt may be offset under section 553 of this title against a
claim against the debtor.
Section 543 provides in a similar way for turnover with respect to custodians. Sections
542 and 543 give the bankruptcy trustee the power, under certain circumstances, to compel
third parties to deliver property to the estate. In addition, § 502(d) requires the court to disallow
the claims of any creditor from which property is recoverable under § 542 or § 543 until the
creditor has turned over that property. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (1984). The turnover power has a
much broader scope than the estate's other federally-created powers. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C.
§§ 547, 548 (1984); see infra note 149.
149. For example, a turnover order based on an inheritance of certain property may raise
the issue of the validity of a will; a turnover order based on a transfer of property by deed
may require litigation on the validity of the deed; a third party served with a turnover order
could raise the issue of whether he holds the subject property by bailment or gift. Each of
these examples raises issues outside the core of bankruptcy administration. In addition, some
courts have interpreted turnover orders to include contract actions and other suits for damages.
See, e.g., Fisher v. Insurance Co. of State of Pa. (In re Pied Piper Casuals, Inc.), 13 Bankr.
Ct. Dec. 290 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Sunrise Equip. & Dev. Corp., 24 Bankr. 26 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1982); In re Franklin Computer Corp., 12 Collier Bank. Cas. 2d 1447 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1985). The better view is to the contrary. See Century Brass Prod. v. Millard Metals Serv.
Center (In re Century Brass Prod., Inc.), 58 Bankr. 838, 840-43 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1986). Even
so, proceedings will often involve issues outside the core of bankruptcy administration.
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proceedings should be limited. When a turnover action raises issues outside
the heart of bankruptcy administration, it should not be treated as a core
proceeding unless the court determines that the subject property is within its
actual or constructive possession.
With the exception of express statutory grants or absent consent of the
parties, the bankruptcy courts had summary jurisdiction under the Act of
1898 only to adjudicate controversies concerning property over which the
court had actual or constructive possession.5 0 The possession rule was not
the product of statute. Rather, it rested upon principles concerning the power
and competence of courts in general.' Third parties served with an order
to show cause why they should not turn over property to the trustee had
three options: (1) turn the property over; (2) appear without objecting to
summary disposition of the order and defend on the merits; or (3) appear
for a preliminary hearing on the issue of whether the bankruptcy court had
constructive possession of the property in question." 2 There was no substantial question as to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to conduct such a
150. See Harris v. Avery Brundage Co., 305 U.S. 160, 163 (1938) (test of jurisdiction is not
title in, but possession by, the bankrupt at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy).
The constructive possession cases provide only an implication of constitutionality; the practice
was never challenged as unconstitutional. However, it rests upon such fundamental principles
of in rem jurisdiction that if the practice were found unconstitutional, the very idea of a federal
bankruptcy court system would be called into question. See infra note 151. In light of
the similarity of the court systems under the Acts of 1898 and 1984, see supra notes 50-54
and accompanying text, the scope of summary jurisdiction under the Act of 1898 serves as a
guideline in determining whether Congress intended a matter to be treated as a core proceeding
under the Act of 1984.
151. In Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1 (1902), the Supreme Court illustrated this point:
[T~he question reduces itself to this: Has the bankruptcy court the power to compel
the bankrupt, or his agent, to deliver up money or other assets of the bankrupt,
in his possession or that of someone for him, on petition and rule to show cause?
Does a mere refusal by the bankrupt or his agent so to deliver up oblige the trustee
to resort to a plenary suit in the Circuit Court or a state court, as the case may
be?
If it be so, the grant of jurisdiction to cause the estates of bankrupts to be
collected, and to determine controversies relating thereto, would be seriously impaired, and, in many respects, rendered practically inefficient.
The bankruptcy court would be helpless indeed if the bare refusal to turn over
could conclusively operate to drive the trustee to an action to recover as for an
indebtedness, or a conversion, or to proceedings in chancery, at the risk of the
accompaniments of delay, complication, and expense, intended to be avoided by
the simpler methods of the bankrupt law.
Id. at 14. See also Chandler v. Perry, 74 F.2d 371 (5th Cir. 1934), in which the court states:
The jurisdiction to dispose of property . . . in the court's actual or constructive
possession, and as ancillary thereto to deal with all claims of title to or interest in
or liens upon it . . . is not peculiar to courts of bankruptcy, but appertains to all
courts having possession of property for disposition, and rests largely upon necessity,
inasmuch as by a settled principle [that] no other court is allowed to interfere with
property thus in custodia legis.
Id. at 372.
152. J. MACLACHIAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 194 (1956).
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preliminary hearing.153 The mere assertion of a claim adverse to the estate
would not require resort to a plenary suit.'54 To the contrary, the court had
both the power and the duty to examine the adverse claim to ascertain
whether it was ingenuous and substantial.' 55 The Supreme Court identified
specific fact patterns as raising a presumption that property was within the
constructive possession of the bankruptcy court. 15 6 However, these instances
were quite limited. Beyond this, courts deemed property to be within their
constructive possession if the adverse claimant did not assert a sufficiently
substantial claim to the contrary. 57
The possession rule was derived not from the Act of 1898 itself, but from
the simple concept of in rem jurisdiction. Therefore, the rule can successfully
be employed by courts under the Act of 1984 as a device for keeping the
scope of core turnover proceedings within constitutional bounds. The bankruptcy judge should initially determine whether a third party holding property
has a real and substantial claim to that property, asserted in good faith.
This preliminary hearing should be classified as a non-core proceeding in
which the district judge reviews any findings of fact de novo. 58 If the
bankruptcy judge finds that the property is within the constructive possession
of the bankruptcy court, 5 9 and that finding is not reversed by a higher court,
the action to turn over the property should be litigated as a core proceeding.

153. Id.
154. Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191, 194 (1926).
155. Louisville Trust Co. v. Comingor, 184 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1902).
156. These fact patterns included (1) when property was in the physical possession of the
bankrupt at the time of the petition, but was not delivered to the bankruptcy trustee, Page v.
Edmunds, 187 U.S. 596, 601-05 (1903); (2) when property was delivered to the trustee, but was
thereafter wrongfully withdrawn from his custody, White v. Schloerb, 178 U.S. 542, 545-48
(1900); (3) when property was in the hands of the bankrupt's agent or bailee, Mueller v.
Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1902); or (4) when property was held by one who made no claim
to it, Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U.S. 102, 105 (1910).
157. No hard-and-fast test was developed for determining what constituted a sufficiently
substantial claim. Supreme Court formulations of what would enable a third party to avoid
summary jurisdiction included a "good faith claim adverse to the estate," Galbraith v. Vallely,
256 U.S. 46, 50 (1921); a claim that is "not frivolous," Cline v. Kaplan, 323 U.S. 97, 99
(1944); and a claim that is not "merely colorable," Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264
U.S. 426, 433 (1924). The late Professor MacLachlan suggested that a convenient test might
be whether there is "substantial doubt about either the facts or the law controlling the
defendant's claim"; at the same time, however, he advised against any reliance on this test. J.
MAcLACHLA, supra note 152.
158. Alternatively, the district court could conduct the preliminary hearing itself and refer
the matter to the bankruptcy court if it finds that the third party is asserting no more than a
"colorable claim." While there is no provision for such a preliminary hearing in the Act of
1984, neither was there a provision under the Act of 1898 that called for courts to employ the
idea of constructive possession. If the district court exercised de novo review of the initial
determination or made the initial determination itself, ultimate access to an article III court on
the issue of possession would be preserved.
159. See supra note 147. This phrase is used to mean possession of property sufficient so
that litigation over it may justifiably be treated as a core proceeding.

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 35:675

If the bankruptcy judge, or a higher court on review, determines that the
property is not within the constructive possession of the bankruptcy court,
the turnover action should be litigated as a non-core proceeding, with the
district court reviewing all findings of fact made by the bankruptcy judge
60
de novo. 1

This interpretation is justified by reading section 157 as including some
"orders to turn over property of the estate," rather than all "orders to turn
over property of the estate," as core proceedings. When two interpretations
of a statute are reasonable, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional,
courts must give the statute a constitutional interpretation rather than invalidate it.16I Applying the possession doctrine to the Act of 1898 will ensure
that the scope of core turnover proceedings does not exceed the bounds of
article I power.
C. Preferences and Fraudulent Conveyances;
The Standard of Review
Section 157 includes "proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences" and "proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances" as core proceedings. 62 These two provisions cover four different
types of actions. While sections 547 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code govern
preferences and fraudulent transfers, respectively, section 544 allows a trustee
or debtor-in-possession to resort to provisions of state law in attempting to
avoid transfers to creditors. 163 State fraudulent conveyance and preference
statutes are thus available under certain circumstances to the trustee.
When a trustee attempts to avoid a transfer under the bankruptcy code's
preference and fraudulent transfer provisions, there is no substantial problem
in treating the matter as a core proceeding. The trustee's claim arises under
congressionally-created substantive rights. Congress "possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which [such rights] may be
adjudicated-including the assignment of some functions historically performed by judges." ' I Northern Pipeline's primary concern was the adjudi-

160. See 28 U.S.C: § 157(c)(1) (1984).
161. "lilt is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction
of the statute is fairly possible by which the [constitutional] question may be avoided." Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932); see also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 365 (1974).
This doctrine has been applied in the context of bankruptcy as well. See United States v.
Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982) (11 U.S.C. § 522(0(2) does not apply to security
interests acquired before the effective date of its enactment; to interpret the statute otherwise
would give rise to serious constitutional problems).
162. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) & (H) (1984).
163. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1043 (1984) (preferential transfers); CONN. GEN.

§ 52-552 (1984) (fraudulent conveyances).
164. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 (plurality opinion). While the Act of 1898 contained
provisions for plenary suits in its preference and fraudulent transfer provisions, the language
of Northern Pipeline strongly suggests that Code-based preferences and fraudulent transfer
actions would be within the scope of issues finally decidable by a non-article III bankruptcy
judge.
STAT.
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cation of rights not created by Congress.

65

Constitutional problems arise

when a trustee bases a claim not on sections 547 or 548, but on section 544,

66
incorporating the law of the state where the bankruptcy court is located.
A trustee might choose to rely on state law provisions either because they
contain terms more favorable than their bankruptcy code counterparts or
because the statute of limitations in the bankruptcy code provision has

expired. 167

165. Id. at 89-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). This was suggested in the plurality opinion,
and the concurring Justices who would be required to form a majority of the Court expressly
limited their concurrence to an invalidation of bankruptcy jurisdiction over purely state law
causes of action. Of course, obedience to Northern Pipeline requires more than merely characterizing causes of action as based on state or federal law. The concurrence did not suggest
that non-tenured officers could hear and determine all federally-based causes of action. However,
the source of the underlying law has significance in its effect on the scope of the powers given
a non-article III bankruptcy judge. By narrowly drawing a cause of action for recovering
property "wrongfully" transferred by the debtor, Congress has created a right integral to the
bankruptcy policy of equal distribution to equally situated creditors. Claims based on these
narrowly drawn federal rights are much closer to the core of bankruptcy administration than
the blank check given the trustee under § 544 to resort to whatever state statutes may be
available. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct 3245, 3259 (1986)
("the state law character of a claim is significant for purposes of determining the effect that
an initial adjudication of those claims by a non-article III tribunal will have on the separation
of powers for the simple reason that [such] rights were historically the types of matters subject
to resolution by Article III courts").
166. 11 U.S.C. § 544 (1984) states:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard
to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or
may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is voidable by(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement
of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial
lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained
such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement
of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an execution
against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a
creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains the
status of a bona fide purchaser perfected such transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
(b) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property or
any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable under applicable law by a
creditor holding an unsecured claim that is allowable under section 502 of this title
or that is not allowable only under section 502(e) of this title.
167. For example, a trustee cannot recover under § 548 a fraudulent transfer that occurred
more than one year before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, the trustee must resort
to state fraudulent conveyance provisions. A trustee who asserts the fraudulent transfer in a
counterclaim may receive the protection of § 502(d). However, if the alleged fraudulent transferee
has not previously filed a claim, the problem arises whether such a state law-based cause of
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One of the central problems in treating a state law-based claim as a core
proceeding is the standard of review for such matters. Section 157(b)(1)
provides that "[b]ankruptcy judges may hear and determine .. . all core
proceedings ...and may enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject
to review under section 158 of this title."'161 Section 158(a) grants the district
courts appellate jurisdiction over final orders and judgments entered by
bankruptcy judges. 69 Bankruptcy Rule 8013 provides that on appeal,
"[flindings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous." The
clearly erroneous standard replaced the de novo standard of the Emergency
Rule, which was adopted as a local rule by the district courts following
0
While the Emergency Rule established de novo review
Northern Pipeline."1
for findings of fact in all proceedings,' 7 ' Rule 8013 and the Act of 1984 now
provide that review of findings of fact in core proceedings should be by the
clearly erroneous standard, while review of non-core proceedings should be
de novo. This is the only material difference between the jurisdictional
provisions of the Act of 1984 and the Emergency Rule, which was upheld
72
The constiby all courts of appeals that considered its constitutionality.
tutional question is whether applying such a standard to findings of fact by
a bankruptcy judge in a state law-based cause of action vests too much
judicial power in a non-article III officer.
The standard of review in core proceedings was considered in Bank of
New Richmond v. Production Credit Association of River Falls, Wisconsin
(In re Osborne)." 3 Osborne upheld the clearly erroneous standard against
the challenge that the standard conflicted with Northern Pipeline. The court
pointed out that the standard of review in the Reform Act was merely one
of the factors that impermissibly vested the essential attributes of an article
III court in a non-article III officer. According to Osborne, Northern Pipeline
strongly suggested that none of the fatal characteristics of the Reform Act,
taken alone, would have sufficed to render that Act's jurisdictional provisions
unconstitutional, with the exception of jurisdiction over "related" matters

action can be adjudicated as a core proceeding. Whether the Congressional directive contained
in § 502(d) saves the constitutionality of treating a state law-based preference or fraudulent
conveyance claims as a core proceeding is uncertain.
168. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1984).
169. Id. § 158(a).
170. EMERGENCY RULE § (e)(2)(B) (Admin. Office of the United States Courts (1982)).
171. The Emergency Rule divided proceedings into "related proceedings," corresponding for
the most part to non-core proceedings, and "non-related proceedings," corresponding to core
proceedings.
172. In re Colorado Energy Supply, Inc., 728 F.2d 1283 (10th Cir. 1984); In re UNR Indus.,
Inc., 725 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1984); Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068 (3d
Cir. 1983); In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574 (2d Cir. 1983); White Motor Corp. v. Citibank, N.A.,
704 F.2d 254 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Hansen, 702 F.2d 728 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 3589 (1983); In re Braniff Airways Inc., 700 F.2d 214 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 103 S.
Ct. 2122 (1983).
173. 42 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984).
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and the total grant of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts. 17 4
The court also noted that the Act of 1984 places considerably greater
limitations on the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts.' Additionally, the
application of the clearly erroneous standard is limited to core proceedings,
while Northern Pipeline's primary concern was with the extension of bank71 6
ruptcy jurisdiction to matters outside the "core" of bankruptcy power.
The court concluded that the Act of 1984 reserves most, if not all, of the
essential attributes of judicial power in the district court.
Osborne provides persuasive support for the argument that the treatment
of congressionally-created substantive rights in the Act of 1984 meets the
requirements of Northern Pipeline. Congress has substantial discretion to
prescribe how such rights may be adjudicated, but it must exercise that
discretion in such a way that the "essential attributes of judicial power are
retained in an Article III judge."' 7 7 Even if Osborne is correct, however,
it neither considered nor upheld the adjudication of state law-based causes
of action as a core proceedings. 7 8
Although there has been no other significant litigation over the standard
of review incorporated in the Act of 1984, several courts of appeals have
recently considered the constitutionality of provisions of the Magistrates Act
of 1979 that contain similar standards of review. The Magistrates Act allows
magistrates to conduct civil trials and order entry of judgments with the
consent of the parties. 179 Appeal to the court of appeals is made in the same
manner as appeal from a district court. s0 By consent of the parties, appeal
can also be made to the district court."' In either case, the reviewing court
applies the clearly erroneous standard to the magistrate's findings of fact.
The district judge has the power to vacate any consensual8 2reference to a
magistrate on his own motion or on the motion of a party.
All courts of appeals that have considered section 636(c) of the Magistrates
Act have upheld its constitutionality.'83 These courts have found two aspects

174. Id. at 993.
175. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1984) limits district court jurisdiction by requiring abstention in
some situations; § 157(b)(5) gives jurisdiction over wrongful death cases to the district court;
§§ 157(a) & (d) place jurisdiction entirely in the district courts, by permitting district judges
not only to refer cases to bankruptcy judges, but also to withdraw reference at any time.
176. Osborne, 42 Bankr. at 994. See also Briden v. Foley, 776 F.2d 379 (1st Cir. 1985)
(upholding constitutionality of clearly erroneous standard in § 547 preference action).
177. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84-85 (plurality opinion).

178. The matter adjudicated as a core proceeding in Osborne was an application of equitable
subordination of a creditor's claim for allegedly inequitable conduct, a matter arising solely
under federal bankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1984); Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295
(1939).
179. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
180. Id. § 636(c)(3).
181. Id. § 636(c)(4).

182. Id. § 636(c)(6).
183. Fields v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890 (D.C.Cir. 1984); Lehman
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of the Magistrates Act particularly important. First, and most significant, is
the requirement of consent, which the courts have seen as an important
element of Northern Pipeline.'84 While parties cannot consent to subject
matter jurisdiction, jurisdiction under the Magistrates Act resides in the
district courts. The parties merely consent to the particular mode of trial,
clearly something to which consent can be given.' 5 The second aspect of the
Magistrates Act is the relationship between the district court and the nonarticle III officer. Magistrates are appointed by the district court, and parties
must consent to reference. Additionally, the reference can be withdrawn at
any time on motion of either the district court or a party.
The fact that the courts of appeal have unanimously upheld section 636(c)
informs the general analysis of the Act of 1984, but it does not guarantee
the constitutionality of adjudicating a state law-based cause of action as a
core proceeding. Consent, or lack thereof, appears to be the most significant
factor to courts that have considered section 636(c). Therefore, a lack of
consent may be fatal.
Osborne and the section 636(c) litigation do not definitely determine
whether a trustee's cause of action that incorporates state fraudulent conveyance law can be constitutionally adjudicated as a core proceeding if the
defendant has not filed a claim in the bankruptcy case. Once again, the best
source of comparison is Northern Pipeline. Northern sought to sue Marathon
on a breach of contract claim in the bankruptcy court at a time when
Marathon was a stranger to Northern's bankruptcy case. Six members of
the Supreme Court agreed that Northern's claim arose entirely under state
law. Accordingly, the Court held that a non-article III bankruptcy judge
could not render a final judgment on such an issue, which would bind a
party who was otherwise uninvolved in the bankruptcy case. In contrast to
Northern Pipeline, a trustee in our example could rely on section 544 to
provide access to state fraudulent conveyance law. This would not, however,
negate the trustee's dependence on state law. Mere reliance on section 544

Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 739 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984); Puryear
v. EDE's, Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir.
1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diag. Clinic of America,
Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1984); Wharton-Thomas v. United States,
721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983).
184. Weber v. Mathews, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). Raddatz and Northern Pipeline are read by
the courts as establishing that the decision-making power must remain in an article III court
when parties have not consented to determination by a non-article III officer; they cannot be
read as controlling in cases involving consensual reference.
185. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 38(d) (waiver of trial by jury if no timely request made). In
discussing the consent issue, the courts have relied on Heckers v. Fowler, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.)
123 (1864), a case upholding the constitutionality of a system by which litigants could consent
to have a case assigned to a referee for trial, with the referee to enter final judgment. Apparently,
no more recent case exists that could be used as authority for this point. But see Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 106 S. Ct. 3245, 3256 (1986) ("Article III's guarantee of
an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver").
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would not create a cause of action arising under congressionally-created
substantive law. If this were so, then any cause of action brought by a
bankruptcy trustee would be based on congressionally-created substantive
law, because the trustee is a creature of federal law and cannot bring suit
without specific authorization under federal law. Although the trustee gains
access to state fraudulent conveyance law through section 544(a), the cause
of action depends on the existence of relevant state law. This is analogous
to Northern Pipeline, in which the debtor-in-possession was empowered to
sue by provisions of federal law, s 6 but its suit depended on the existence of
a state law cause of action. As Mr. Justice Holmes stated in a related
' 7
context, "a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.'
The debtor-in-possession in Northern Pipeline could have prevailed only
under state contract law. Likewise, the trustee in the above-mentioned hypothetical could recover only under state fraudulent conveyance law. This
involves a cause of action based no less on state law than that of the debtorin-possession in Northern Pipeline.
The jurisdictional provisions in the Act of 1984 may be an improvement
over the previous system, but the improvements do not remedy the constitutional problems created by allowing a bankruptcy judge to enter final
judgments in actions such as the one discussed above. In fact, the disposition
of the state law-based fraudulent conveyance claim is the same under the
Reform Act and the Act of 1984. If treated as a core proceeding, the
bankruptcy judge would render a final judgment, with appeal to the district
court. The district court would not reverse as to findings of fact unless those
findings were "clearly erroneous." Under the Act of 1984, the district court
can withdraw its reference to the bankruptcy judge at any time, but this is
not enough to save an otherwise unconstitutional delegation of power to a
non-article III judge.

186. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1984) states:
(a) Subject to any limitations on a trustee serving in a case under this chapter, and
to such limitations or conditions as the court prescribes, a debtor-in-possession shall
have all the rights .... and powers, and shall perform all the functions and duties,
...of a trustee serving in a case under this chapter.
11 U.S.C. § 323 (1984) states:
(a) The trustee in a case under this title is the representative of the estate.
(b) The trustee in a case under this title has the capacity to sue and be sued.
There is no material difference for the discussion in the text accompanying this note between
a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession and a bankruptcy trustee, since they have the same powers
and duties, with certain exceptions not relevant here.
187. American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (landmark
case on issue of what constitutes a cause of action "arising under" the laws of the United
States over which federal courts have federal question jurisdiction). See also Havee v. Belk,
775 F.2d 1209, 1218 (4th Cir. 1985) ("while it is the federal law [§ 544] which provides the
trustee with his 'strong-arm' power, his exercise of such power and its extent are governed
entirely by the applicable state law").
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One court has suggested a possible saving provision. It proposes that the
district judge can withdraw its reference and review all findings de novo
even after a bankruptcy judge has entered a final judgment in a core
proceeding.' 8 This interpretation, however, is unwarranted by the statutory
language. The Emergency Rule provided for de novo review of all findings
of bankruptcy judges in all proceedings by the district court, whether related
(non-core) or non-related (core).8 9 The Act of 1984 was essentially a codification of the Emergency Rule, except that the standard of review of findings
of fact in core proceedings was changed from the de novo standard to an
appellate standard,190 which Bankruptcy Rule 8013 tells us is a "clearly
erroneous" standard. De novo review following a final judgment in a core
proceeding is irreconcilable with the language of the Act of 1984.
However, there is room in the new Act to allow for a constitutionally
permissible interpretation. Subsections (F) and (H) of section 157(b)(2) can
be interpreted to allow jurisdiction over some, rather than all, proceedings
to determine, avoid or recover preferences and fraudulent conveyances. By
reading these subsections to include all such proceedings except those based
on section 544(a) or state law, brought by a trustee or debtor-in-possession
against a defendant who has not filed a claim in the bankruptcy case,' 9'
constitutional violations could be avoided without the heavy hand employed
92
by the Northern Pipeline plurality.
CONCLUSION

Case law suggests that some of the jurisdictional provisions of the Act of
1984, if construed broadly, could lead to unconstitutional results. Therefore,
courts should interpret these provisions in a manner consistent with available

188. Danning v. Lummis (In re Tom Carter Enterprises), 44 Bankr. 605 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
1984). On February 20, 1985, the same court issued a second memorandum and order in Danning
v. Lummis, 5 Bankr. L. Ed. Current Awareness Alert, Part II, 84 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. August,
1985), deleting this dictum from its opinion.
189. EMERGENCY RULE § (e)(2)(B) (Admin. Office of the United States Courts (1982)).
190. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1984). This important difference has been ignored by some
courts that have undertaken to compare the Emergency Rule and the Act of 1984. See Firestone
v. Dale Beggs & Assoc. (In re Northwest Cinema Corp.), 49 Bankr. 479, 482-83 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1985); Baldwin-United Corp. v. Thompson (In re Baldwin-United Corp.), 48 Bankr. 49,
54 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
191. See supra note 167 (to the effect that perhaps the reading of subsections (F) and (H)
should also exclude such claims even if they constitute counterclaims).
192. Courts have already begun reading portions of the Act as broadly as possible, and have
found constitutional violations. See, e.g., Associated Grocers of Nebr. Coop., Inc. v. Nabisco
Bakers (In re Associated Grocers of Nebr. Coop., Inc.), 46 Bankr. 173 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985)
(conferring jurisdiction on bankruptcy courts to determine whether to avoid or recover preference
is constitutional); Addison v. O'Leary (In re TWI, Inc.), 13 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 287 (Bankr. E.D.

Va. 1985) (fraudulent and voluntary conveyances outside bankruptcy court jurisdiction).
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constitutional guidelines to avoid such a result.' 93 Nothing in the language
of section 157 compels the broadest possible reading. When two constructions

of a statute are reasonable, one constitutional and the other unconstitutional,
94
it is well-established that courts should prefer the constitutional reading.1

Whether Congress intended these provisions to be read broadly or narrowly
cannot be determined. There is no "legislative history" accompanying the
Act, 95 only conflicting statements of individual legislators. 96 What is apparent, however, is that Congress intended to create a constitutionally valid

jurisdictional system substantially similar to that of the Bankruptcy Act of
1898, under which federal courts operated for eighty years. During those
years, courts spent a great deal of time determining the limits of bankruptcy

jurisdiction. Now that the courts face similar issues, it would be foolish not
to take advantage of the product of that work: a body of caselaw with

different terminology, but analogous concepts. Use of that caselaw, read
with Northern Pipeline, may enable courts to avoid constitutional problems

without straining for unnatural readings of the new law.

193. "[T]he Supreme Court has made such a mess of this phase of the law that medieval
theologians could be as reliable a source of guidance on it as modern professors." Letter from
Charles Alan Wright to Hon. Peter W. Rodino (June 4, 1976), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6049. Several courts have exercised restraint in their readings of the
Act of 1984. See Pierce v. Airport Dev. Co. (In re Pierce), 44 Bankr. 601 (D. Colo. 1984);
Bokum Resources Corp. v. Long Island Lighting Co. (In re Bokum Resources Corp.), 13
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 11 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1985); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Borg-Warner Acceptance
Corp. (In re Dr. C. Huff Co.), 44 Bankr. 129 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984).
194. See supra note 165.

195. The Conference Report of the Act of 1984 contains only the text of the Act itself.
196. "[I]solated statements by individual Members of Congress or its committees, all made
after the enactment of the statute under consideration, cannot substitute for a clear expression
of legislative intent at the time of enactment ....

[None of these comments] represents the

will of Congress as a whole." Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 411
n.11 (1979) (citations omitted). See also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania,
Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980) ("ordinarily even the contemporaneous remarks of a single
legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history").

